

Latin American Secretaries-General of International Organizations and the Diplomacy of Prestige

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Abstract

The paper aims to discuss the hypothesis of a ‘diplomacy of prestige’ by rising Latin American states through the appointment and/or election of diplomats and politicians who take office as secretaries-general of major intergovernmental organizations. This exploratory research will involve two parts, based on information retrieved from the IO BIO project’s database of secretaries-general of international organizations [www.ru.nl/fm/iobio]. First, we briefly assess general data about 86 Latin American secretaries-general of regional and global international organizations between 1948 and 2015, with a view of providing a group analysis and an interpretive account of their personal and professional trajectories. Second, we focus on a prosopography of ten case studies of Latin American secretaries-general: Ayala Lasso and Vieira de Mello at UNHCHR, Baena Soares and Gaviria Trujillo at OAS, Bustani at OPCW, Candau at WHO, Holanda Cavalcanti at Latin Union, Kirchner at Unasur, Prebisch at ECLA and UNCTAD, and Ricupero at UNCTAD. The purpose is to shed light on the relationships they maintained over time with their respective countries of origin and the region as a whole. We will also discuss the rival hypothesis that the tenure in office of Latin American secretaries-general is not directly associated with any prestige-seeking governmental drive or an emerging country’s manoeuvre for greater international status, but rather a collateral effect of growing transnational cosmopolitanism.

INTRODUCTION

When one hears the former Research Director of the Group of 24, Gerry Helleiner, affirming that “I am increasingly driven to the thought that individuals are enormously influential. Politicians and people in key positions of authority... They do really matter” (SCHROEDER 2014: 339), it is reasonable to infer that the role of individuals in IR has not been taken seriously yet. The disregard of the role of individuals, probably driven by a quest for parsimony in IR theorization, expresses how delicate and taken for granted this personal (subjective) dimension of international politics still remains. In this particular sense, thinking about the place of individuals in IR is one of the objectives of this article. Quite differently from the Realist school, which admits the importance of individuals only when they are in a position of head of state and/or government, this article emphasizes the unique role played by Secretaries-General (SGs) in International Organizations (or formal leaderships, for the purposes of the article). As pointed out by Chesterman (2007), this institutional topic in International Relations is understudied, although it admittedly exerts much influence in political procedures.

Given the purposes of this paper, we will be investigating SGs born in Latin America and their positions in Regional International Organizations (RIOs) and Global Intergovernmental Organizations (GIGOs), and establishing tentative causal connections with their countries of origin. The relations they maintain with their countries of origin can be associated with the so-called ‘diplomacy of prestige,’ which concerns the strategic use of formal leadership positions in IOs as platforms for the pursuit of national interests. In so being, we ask ourselves the following departing question: Would there be a ‘diplomacy of prestige’ put into practice through formal leaderships in Latin American RIOs and in GIGOs as a whole? We hypothesize that by mongering and financially sponsoring electoral campaigns and political appointments of their countrymen – mostly diplomats and politicians – who take office as secretaries-general of IOs, some Latin American states may be resorting to this strategy on a systematic basis, while others prefer not to explore such leverage tool. We then analyze a rival hypothesis – which claims that the tenure in office of Latin American secretaries-general is not directly associated with prestige-seeking governmental drives or to an emerging country’s manoeuvre for greater international status, but rather is a collateral effect of growing transnational cosmopolitanism.

METHODOLOGY AND DATABASE

This exploratory research involves two stages, and is extensively based on information retrieved from the IO BIO Project Database [www.ru.nl/fm/iobio]. First, we briefly assess general data about 86 Latin American secretaries-general of regional and global international organizations between 1948 and 2015, with a view of providing a group analysis and an interpretive account of their personal and professional trajectories. For better visualization of our findings, we use the software Mapviewer 7.0 for thematic map creation. Second, we engage in prosopographical studies of ten cases of Latin American secretaries-general: Ayala Lasso and Vieira de Mello at UNHCHR, Baena Soares and Gaviria Trujillo at OAS, Bustani at OPCW, Candau at WHO, Holanda Cavalcanti at Latin Union, Kirchner at Unasur, Prebisch at ECLA and UNCTAD, and Ricupero at UNCTAD.

The technique of prosopography consists of the investigation of common features from a group of actors which can be identified by a careful assessment of their trajectories. The method establishes a universe of cases to be studied and attempts to find regularities in

order to understand commonly shared factors and distinguishing aspects within the group. The technique of prosopography intends to provide a sense of political action, thus helping to explain ideological changes and continuities of an epoch (STONE 2011). We look forward to evaluating these actors' lives and professional careers, academic formation and connections with their respective countries of origins, with a view at making causal inferences which lead to our working hypothesis. The following section of this paper intends to bring the individual back in International Relations by stressing the capabilities of Secretaries-General in IOs and how they may link with some countries' prestige-seeking policies.

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In this section we intend to discuss the importance of secretaries-general in world politics – especially when they become leaders of Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIOs). A theoretical discussion about the role of individuals in international politics is not so common, as some mainstream theoretical schools of IR, namely Realism and Neo-Realism, tend to portray every and each human being as a 'Hobbesian man' and propose a systemic explanation for political outcomes at the international level. The analysis of individuals in IR, even if in acknowledgement of their political acts and practices, usually confine its scope to political actors such as heads of state and government, and do not ascribe much relevance to the dimension of leadership in international relations (CAMPBELL *apud* KILLE and REINALDA 2013).

The objective of this short theoretical review is to bring out the individual as an important subject of international politics, taken that, according to neo-institutionalist perspectives, persons are embedded in political institutions. It thus allows for the making of political strategies which can affect information diffusion, change the actors' preferences and transmit symbolic power to those vested with institutional responsibility. In this sense, individuals are important because "the chair has powers" (KILLE 2006; TALLBERG 2006).

This theoretical section raises three critical issues. The first one concerns the importance of formal leadership in International Organizations (IOs) as a means to promote its values and political objectives. The second one considers the "chair power" and assumes the double-edged character of a SG, who can conflate institutional and national interests all at once. Moreover, the third theoretical issue regards the "diplomacy of prestige" and how it can be intertwined with the formal leadership in IOs. These three aspects are contemplated in the current section and do help in problematizing the broader question of leadership in IR.

1.1 "THE POWER OF THE CHAIR": FORMAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Jonas Tallberg (2006) comes up with the question of efficiency in the distribution of cooperation in international politics, besides highlighting the importance of institutional variables to overcome political dilemmas (sub-optimal results and difficult bargains). In his work he analyses the influence of formal leaderships (including IO Secretaries-General) and, for the purpose of theory-building, develops a coherent argument on when, why and how formal leaders will exert influence over distributional outcomes in a multilateral negotiation. Tallberg's argument borrows its foundations from rational choice institutionalism and general bargain theory, according to which, if "the chair matters", it is assumed that "Formal leaders fulfill functions that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed and possess privileged resources that make it possible to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer (TALLBERG 2006:1)." In so being, an

institutional formal leader is different from other actors in multilateral contexts, in as much as formal leaders can wield “control over the nature of the game, which offers unique opportunities for influence over the outcomes of negotiations” (id: 3), providing solutions to collective-action problems. If that is so, formal leaders would enjoy asymmetrical access to information and heightened control over procedures, ending up with more leverage during negotiations. The perception of office as a power repository can lead to opportunistic IO chairs, entitled with formal rights by member states, but seeking to conduct a negotiation in conformity with their own interests and, therefore, bringing collateral implications for the parties under international cooperation regimes.

Focusing on the leadership style of office holders, Kille (2006) posits that formal leaders may affect international peace and security by the way they carry out their duties. According to the author, a leadership could be rendered into two contrasting styles: the bureaucratic manager and the visionary activist. In order to make a deep analytical study, Kille’s taxonomy is underpinned by six personal characteristics – “responsivity, belief that [s/he] can influence, need for relationships, need for recognition, supranationalism, and problem-solving emphasis” (id: 3). In this sense, not only institutional variables count, but personalities should be considered as a substantial element in foreign policy analysis. In the light of Tallberg’s model, Kille’s formal leadership model has a more institutional format, which comprises, so to speak, both the demand-side and the supply-side variables. The former are related to the perceived necessity of national governments to create and empower a formal institution to control/affect the process of cooperation, and therefore to elect an institutional leader (a person) to do so. On the ‘supply-side’, what matters is the personality, that is, those individual features which make up a leader capable of handling the political implications associated with multilateral interactions in world politics. In a nutshell, for Tallberg and Kille this is how chairmanship builds up possibilities, constraints and novel dynamics.

For Tallberg (2006), the chair can intervene in the dimension of efficiency when s/he “facilitates decision-making through the execution of agenda management, brokerage, and representation, thus raising the efficiency of the negotiations (TALLBERG 2006: 37)”, and in distribution “when among the bargaining parties by promoting the one agreement – among a range of efficient outcomes – that is closest to its own preferred position, in other words, when reach a great amount of political convergence” (id, *ibid*). However, a formal leadership will always have to deal with a given institutional environment as an intervening variable which sets the conditions when, where and how the chair will be able to influence political procedures and outcomes. A formal leader does not exist in political or institutional vacuum.

Ernst Haas recognizes that the leadership played at the level of IOs’ bureaucracies may spur institutional activism in international relations, while Cox *apud* Kille (2006) point out that the executive heads of IOs are equipped with tools to improve their leadership and their own capabilities inside the IO. Michael Schroeder (2014) claims that the Executive leadership enjoys good conditions for the exercise of politically autonomous actions and entrepreneurship. For Schroeder, three common conditions should be met for it to come true: I) Uncertainty of member states may generate political room for the executive leader to create, propose and advance the IO’s mission; II) Executive leaders can engender appropriate solutions to practical problems when member states are provided with ill/inaccurate information; III) Executive leaders can paralyze intergovernmental bodies and convince their bureaucratic actors to reinterpret existing rules, especially when member states fail to control key institutional resources.

1.2 SG’S “CHAIR POWER” AND THEIR CONNECTIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

In previous sections one finds the argument that a formal leadership usually entails institutional powers which can be used in conformity with a leader's values and preferences. Tallberg (2006) analyzes the political influence played by the Presidency of the European Union and finds out that, recurrently over time, the chair became a platform for political leverage in connection with the leader's preferences. By taking the Presidency, some member states were empowered to directly set the agenda, bypassing binding contents and/or coordinating their positions with regard to third parties.

The exploration of chairmanship for national purposes turned the function of formal leadership into a source for private/unilateral gains. The power of agenda-setting, the prerogative to convene formal or informal meetings, and to determine/change priority levels attributed to procedures/stages during negotiations were good evidence of this double-edged character of the Presidency. It produces a certain paradox, as Chesterman (2006) argues that sometimes a Secretary-General can be more influential and enjoy extra leeway when him or herself adapts to the interests of member states, that is, for a certain degree of success the formal leader needs to accommodate national interests, so his/her country of origin can be – at least partially – positively contemplated by this attitude. The institutional environment itself can enable and improve the abilities of a formal leadership to work under such 'double allegiance' paradigm. As Tallberg correctly puts it:

“Presidencies use privileged information obtained through bilateral consultations to extract concessions from adversaries, and single negotiating texts to keep desired components on the negotiation table and unwelcome options away from it. Furthermore, Presidencies speed up negotiations and improve the chances of agreement on nationally prioritized issues through decisions on the frequency and format of bargaining sessions (TALLBERG 2006: 10-11).”

According to Tallberg, one reason why there will be more or less polemic about that particular issue is the institutional design of the chair itself. For example, rotation among member states in regard to the chairman's nationality, obligation to elect a chairman from one of the member states, and appointment of a supranational official as the chairman can produce some diffuse reciprocity among participant states that work to the benefit of formal leaderships. The elections of chairmen by states put the question of control in the center of the process, but also give an opportunity to other states to use the procedure to explore the value of chairmanship. There is not a direct association between the nationality of a formal leader and the exploration of the chairmanship to the advantage of his/her country of origin. However, it is possible that some sort of benefit be expected as nation states seek to profit from this position in order to increase the gains inside the organization or set the agenda just because there is a compatriot in office. If the formal leadership can be seen as an asset for nation states to pursue their foreign policy goals, such relationship must be analyzed in this article. Our underlying assumption is that prestige is important to states, and to the extent that prestige can be attached to formal leadership, nation states may look for it.

1.3 CHAIRMANSHIP AND THE DIPLOMACY OF PRESTIGE

Concerns about the analytical category of 'prestige' in international politics have first come, quite surprisingly, from the Realist tradition (WYLIE 2006). For the realists, it usually involves how great powers manage to translate prestige/reputation into military power. Etzioni (1962), for instance, is worried about how this military status attached to prestige can produce cooperation and peace. For him, prestige is “a judgment about the relative standing of one party made by other parties. This judgment depends not only on what a country is, but also on the standards by which the country is evaluated... this evaluation is according to military capabilities.” (ETZIONI 1962: 24) On other hand, constructivists emphasize the

social meaning attached to material stuff, assuming that the facts of international relations are socially constructed, so if states are social actors, recognition and prestige can generate perceptions of other states in social interactions (WYLIE 2006). However, the concept of prestige is far from being a coherent and pacific one. Wylie says it is an amorphous construct which needs to be differentiated from other concepts. Reputation, for example, according to Miller, is “a judgment about an actor’s past behavior that is used to predict future behavior” (MILLER *apud* WYLIE 2006: 5); in this sense, prestige can be gained from a consolidated positive reputation. Prestige is “the high level of respect accorded to states by the other actors in the international system. States with prestige are recognized by the other actors as having a high standing either generally or with regard to a particular issue area, which means they will receive respect or esteem from other actors.” (id, *ibid*) Prestige also is a moral category, related not only to raw power or the military, which means that, beyond its appeal for great powers, small and middle powers will also care about their reputation, as their normative prestige can open doors for cooperation, alliances and optimal results in international negotiations. Therefore, prestige is (or should mean) strength in a normative way, transforming national states into moral authorities in international politics. Thus, engagement in a policy of prestige aims not only to achieve material capabilities, but especially to explore within a normative spectre an alternative course of action in international politics, embedding in foreign policy some values and perceptions that can be disseminated in world politics.

As for the formal leadership issue, leaders can be important assets inside international organizations for nation states. Having a formal executive head associated with the national state fuels ambitions and can actually increase the prestige of a given state. Using the multilateral tools at hand to advance a national perspective is a low-cost strategy for a state with a notorious desire for soft power and reputation. The main question raised by this article concerns the use of formal leadership by nation states to promote national values and increase the prestige in international relations. Are the cases to be assessed in this article exemplary of this ‘policy of prestige’? This paper will try to respond to it in the coming sections. The next one will provide an overview of SGs from Latin America in RIOS and GIGOs, and the final section will approach 10 prosopographies to find out if there is any strong association between a supposed policy of prestige and the pursuit of national interests by specific states.

2. OVERVIEW OF LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARIES-GENERAL IN IOS

This section presents an overview of the Secretaries-General from Latin America, focusing on the presence of national citizens in Regional International Organizations (RIOs) and Global International Organizations (GIGOs). From the regional perspective nine RIOs have been scrutinized: OAS (Organization of American States), ACS (Association of Caribbean States), CARICOM (Caribbean Community), OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States), UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), CAN (Andean Community), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), LAIA (Latin American Integration Association), and SICA (Central American Integration System). At the global level, eleven GIGOs were investigated: WHO (World Health Organization), UN (United Nations), WTO (World Trade Organization), UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organization), ITSO (International Telecommunications Satellite Organization), UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization), UPU (Universal Postal Union), OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees), UNWOMEN, and UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). Table 1 presents the number of Latin-American citizens who have taken the leadership of these institutions.

TABLE 1 – Number of Latin American SGs in RIOs and GIGOs:

Latin American Regional Organizations (# of Latin American SGs between the brackets)
OAS [14]
ACS [5]
CARICOM [8]
OECS [5]
UNASUR [4]
CAN [9]
MERCOSUR [9]
LAIA [5]
SICA [8]
Global Organizations (# of Latin American SGs between the brackets)
WHO [1]
UN [1]
WTO [1]
UNWTO [1]
ITSO [1]
UNIDO [2]
UPU [1]
OPCW [2]
UNHCR [3]
UNWOMEN [1]
UNCTAD [5]

Source: IO BIO Database (2016).

From 1948 to 2015, there were at least 66 Latin American Secretaries-General in RIOs and 19 in GIGOs. Gender distribution is highly unequal, since only 4 women took office as SGs in RIOs and 1 in GIGOs (unsurprisingly, that was Michelle Bachelet, the former president of Chile, at UNWOMEN), which shows a huge predisposition from member countries in favoring males in leading positions of international institutions. Data also reveal a considerable discrepancy about which states have provided more SGs to RIOs and GIGOs over time. Table 2 brings out such difference in regional vis-à-vis global platforms:

TABLE 2 – Number of Secretaries-General in RIOs and GIGOs (per Latin American country)

Regional Organizations


Countries	#
Antigua e Barbuda	1
Costa Rica	1
Grenada	1
Guatemala	1
Guiana	1
São Vicente	1
Bolivia	2
Chile	2
Ecuador	2
Jamaica	2
Nicaragua	2
Peru	2
Dominican Republic	2
Dominica	2
Santa Lucia	2
Barbados	3
El Salvador	3
Honduras	3
Trinidad e Tobago	3
Paraguay	4
Venezuela	4
Brazil	4
Argentina	5
Uruguay	5
Colombia	8
Global Organizations	
Countries	#
Peru	1
Ecuador	1
Guyana	1
Venezuela	1
Mexico	2
Chile	4
Argentina	3

Source: IO BIO Database (2016).

At the regional level, Colombia is the leading country when it comes to providing SGs to RIOs, being followed by Uruguay and Argentina. A partial explanation for it would be the massive Colombian participation in Latin American integrational experiments through IOs in the Andes and the Caribbean. Colombia takes part in the OAS, ACS, UNASUR and CAN, having led these organizations at least once. At the Andean Community, for being a very important player in the region, Colombia has conceded no less than 3 SGs. The second place in the ranking of RIOs is taken by Uruguay and Argentina which, despite not as engaged as Colombia in international institutional politics, have showed their credentials as important regional players too: Uruguay has had 2 SGs in Mercosur, 1 in LAIA, and 2 in OAS, while Argentina has provided 1 SG to OAS, 1 to UNASUR, 1 to LAIA, and 2 to Mercosur.

The situation changes if looked from a global viewpoint. Brazil, which has had not so many SGs in regional organizations over time, takes the lead among Latin Americans in providing SGs to GIGOs. From 1948 to 2015, Brazil has witnessed their national citizens to take office as SGs in the WHO, WTO, UPU, OPCW, UNHCR, and UNCTAD, what certainly contributes for the understanding of certain positions adopted in Brazilian foreign policy, such as the prevalence of multilateralism over bilateralism and the investment in formal institutional environments. Brazil has historically been more strongly represented in technical institutions of global scope, attributing more weight to world-scale rather than regional organizations. This finding is consistent with Andrés Malamud's argument about Brazil being a "leader without followers" in Latin America, a reality which sharply contrasts with the spread-out self-image of a South American emerging global player. In his rendition, "Brazil is likely to consolidate itself as a middle global power before gaining acceptance as a leader in its region" (MALAMUD 2011: 1). Figure 1 shows the force of Brazil in conceding SGs to GIGOs, being followed by their partners from the Southern Cone, namely Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.


FIGURE 1 – Thematic map of SGs (per country)



Source: IO BIO Database (2016).

When Latin American sub-regional complexes are compared, the Southern Cone and the Andes strike as major SG providers, which can be explained by their inclination to embrace regional integration processes. However, some small countries, such as those from the Caribbean Sea and the Amazon Forest, have already had 15 SGs in Latin American RIOs, partly because of their integrational endeavor – exemplified by CARICOM, ACS, OECS, SICA, and the like – providing a good platform for the exercise of influence at the regional level. Countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, and Dominican Republic, which do not have much leverage on the global scale, can wield some power in their region through RIOs. The same happens to Nicaragua and El Salvador inside SICA, as they exert leadership in Central America by way of being continuous providers of SGs to this institution.

FIGURE 2 – Secretaries-General in Latin American IOs (per region)



Source: IO BIO Database (2016).

A wholly different picture is portrayed in regard to the participation of Latin American SGs in GIGOs. Altogether, they amount to 19 individuals, who are distributed among technically and politically-oriented organizations, most of them dedicated to economic development and human rights. However, in comparison with other countries from the Global North, the difference is abyssal. The United States have had 44 SGs in GIGOs over time, being followed by Switzerland, whose all-time record is 23 SGs, and France, which accounts for 19 SGs. It means that just France totals the same number of Latin Americans (from 9 distinct countries) who ever became SGs in global intergovernmental organizations.

TABLE 3 – Latin American SGs in GIGOs

IO	SG name	Period	Country of origin
WHO	Candau, Marcelino Gomes	1953-1973	Brazil
UN	Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier	1982-1991	Peru
WTO	Roberto Azevedo	2013-now	Brazil

UNWTO	Savignac, Antonio Enríquez	1990-1996	Mexico
ITSO	Astrain Castro, Santiago	1964-1973	Chile
UNIDO	De Maria y Campos, Mauricio Magariños, Carlos Alfredo	1993-1997 1997-2005	Mexico Argentina
UPU	Botto de Barros, Adwaldo Cardoso	2009-2011	Brazil
OPCW	Bustani, Jose M. Pfirter, Rogelio	1997-2002 2002-2009	Brazil Argentina
UNHCR	Ayala-Lasso, José Vieira de Mello, Sérgio Ramcharan, Bertrand G.	1994-1997 2002-2003 2003-2004	Ecuador Brazil Guyana
UNWOMEN	Bachelet, Michelle	2006-2010	Chile
UNCTAD	Prebisch, Raúl Pérez-Guerrero, Manuel Fortin, Carlos Ricupero, Rubens Fortin, Carlos	1964-1969 1969-1974 1974-1984 1995-2004 2004-2005	Argentina Venezuela Chile Brazil Chile

Source: IO BIO Database (2016).

In so being, it is arguable that inequalities can be found both at the regional as well as at the global level. In the regional level there clearly is an over-representation of SGs from the Southern Cone and the Andes; that would be uncomparable, however, to the stark asymmetry identified at the global level, given the massive appointment of SGs from the Global North vis-à-vis the South.

3. CASE STUDIES

This section discusses the main argument of the article: the alleged ‘policy of prestige’ which is put into practice by Latin American states, and its relationship with the role of formal leaders at IOs. We have proposed two hypotheses for testing: 1) Latin American states will resort to a policy of prestige through the appointment and/or election of diplomats and politicians who take office as secretaries-general of major intergovernmental organizations in order to enjoy the formal powers associated to the post. But there is also a rival hypothesis: 2) Tenure in office of Latin American secretaries-general is not directly related to any prestige-seeking governmental drive or an emerging country’s manoeuvre for greater international status, but rather is a collateral effect of growing transnational cosmopolitanism. For that, we compare 10 prosopographical case studies of Latin American secretaries-general, *e.g.* Ayala Lasso and Vieira de Mello at UNHCHR, Baena Soares and Gaviria Trujillo at OAS, Bustani at OPCW, Candau at WHO, Holanda Cavalcanti at Latin Union, Kirchner at Unasur, Prebisch at ECLA and UNCTAD, and Ricupero at UNCTAD. All biographical data have been extracted from the IO BIO Project Database (2016). Our preliminary results are ambivalent, as they offer support to both hypotheses – and there is one clearly deviant case.

3.1. SIMILAR FEATURES OF LATIN AMERICAN SGS

Firstly we will attempt to identify some common features among the cases under scrutiny. By analyzing ten SGS from different countries in Latin America we have found similarities in the pathways they have followed to reach a formal leadership position.

The first one regards the academic background of these leaders: 9 out of 10 SGS have graduated in courses in the fields of Humanities and Social Sciences, the majority of which earning a degree in law (5 out of 9), the others having studied political science, economics and letters/linguistics. The deviant case is Marcolino Gomes Candau, who graduated in Medicine, an academic background which happened to be directly related to the post he reached at the WHO. In this sense, having a background in the Humanities fits many of the functions IOs are expected to perform, be them economic or political in nature. The second similarity observed by the authors is that none of the SGS had worked in a private company before they started their careers at IOs. The ten cases assessed showed a hard governmental bias in their professional histories, as they have typically taken up top positions in the public sector, what has presumably prepared them to reach leading posts in IOs. The case of Geraldo Cavalcanti, who worked at Ericsson Telecommunications for a short period of his life, right after his retirement from Brazil's diplomatic corps, is quite an exception. The third commonality found among the ten SGS whose trajectories were analyzed is that they have demonstrated good mastery of and practical experience with intergovernmental organizations. The paths for such cognitive linkage were basically three: working as interns during their lives at IOs, representing their countries as diplomats or plenipotentiaries within these IOs, or being career bureaucrats at these IOs. This element is important in signaling a rational/technical orientation in the management of IOs, insofar as political and technical expertise at multilateral environments is seen as an important requirement for the performance of the SG's duties. This is to be found in the universe of 10 cases under analysis in this paper.

3.2. POLICY OF PRESTIGE AND THE CASES OF LATIN AMERICAN SGS

The 'policy of prestige' supposedly adopted by states in appointing nationals as SGS in order to get benefits from the formal leadership may be seen in at least 6 out of the 10 cases under assessment, and will usually take place by two diverse ways: The most typical one is associated with a country's ministry of foreign affairs and the use of diplomats. The less typical case is based on presidential diplomacy, where former presidents (or prime ministers in parliamentary democracies) run for SG after leaving their country's leadership.

The class of typical cases can be filled in by José Ayala Lasso, João Clemente Baena Soares, José Mauricio de Figueiredo Bustani, and Rubens Ricupero, whose entire careers were in diplomacy, where all of them have enjoyed a long and rich experience in international negotiations. Lasso, for instance, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ecuador from 1997 to 1999, and also served as an ambassador to Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Peru, Italy, and the former European Economic Community. The trio of Brazilian SGS – Baena Soares, Bustani and Ricupero – displays the same traits as their Ecuadorean counterpart, as the three of them served as ambassadors to most important embassies of Brazil around the world, such as those in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna. In addition to that, and more importantly yet, Brazilian SGS maintain deep institutional relationships with Itamaraty – the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – being either under license or retirement when they took office at IOs. Baena Soares once led the Division of Cultural Relations and worked at the IO Department of Itamaraty; Bustani worked as the Head of the IO Department at Itamaraty; Ricupero was the Head of the South America's Division at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, not to mention his time as a Minister of Finance in Brazil. All of them were rooted in the Brazilian public sector. Their ties with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are/were particularly strong, especially because Itamaraty is a worldly renowned diplomatic agency, known for its institutionalization, professionalism, and internal cohesion, without whose support their appointments would have been very unlikely.

The four 'typical' Latin American SGs defended their respective countries of origin within the ambit of International Organizations: Lasso was Ecuador's ambassador to the UN (1989-1994) and the president of the UN Security Council (1991-1992); Ricupero was appointed Ambassador to Brazil's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN) in 1987, and moved to Geneva, where he worked along with multilateral organizations, in particular the GATT; Bustani worked in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor at the UN and also attended the meetings of the Preparatory Committee to prepare for the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 1992, also known as Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Baena did not work as a national diplomat at IOs whatsoever, but was supported by Itamaraty in his diverse professional missions at the UN and OAS.

Such a deep association between SGs and their national states may lead to the establishment of formal as well as informal connections. Some of these individuals were explicitly encouraged by their countries of origin to take up formal leadership roles, and states even mobilized resources for it to happen. Lasso's nomination, for instance, was welcomed with unanimous approval by member states at the OAS, as his credentials were previously presented by Ecuadorean authorities, not to mention an endorsement received from the former UN SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Bustani was also an exemplary case of how Brazil can be actively involved in SG candidacies. Baena Soares and Ricupero, despite enjoying considerable political capital on their own, have been supported by Brazil's diplomatic machinery too.

An interesting case concerns Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti's trajectory. Despite having served at prestigious embassies in Washington, Moscow, and Brussels as a Brazilian diplomat, and having advanced Brazilian positions both as a delegate at the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and as an ambassador to UNESCO, he has never been openly supported by the Brazilian government for the post of SG at the Latin Union. That was so presumably because this position he reached by his own merits was not deemed to be useful for the purposes of the Brazilian government. This deviant case shows that sometimes, for political as well as practical reasons, a ministry of foreign affairs will not engage in 'policy of prestige' tactics for a national citizen to become a formal leadership.

Take two other cases of 'policy of prestige' where the circumstances are quite distinct: Cesar Augusto Trujillo Gaviria and Néstor Carlos Kirchner, the former presidents of Colombia and Argentina, respectively. Different from what happens to a career diplomat, a president from a Latin American state has a superior symbolic standing nowadays, as s/he has been democratically elected by their people, which allows the employment of different (and better) tools which can more efficiently diffuse prestige and promote national values and interests to a larger scale in international politics. Although Gaviria and Kirchner did not ever join their countries' diplomatic delegations at IOs, both of them have had important roles in what regards regional integration initiatives.

Gaviria was decisive in the negotiations for the Andean Pact, which established a free trade area as well as a customs union involving Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. He has also brokered a trade liberalization agreement with CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, in 1994. Kirchner was diplomatically active and critical of the United States, fiercely opposing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, and by the

same token, re-establishing bilateral relations with Cuba, promoting deeper cooperation between Argentina and Venezuela, and trying to reconcile Mercosur and the Andean Community. It is arguable that his diplomatic entrepreneurship gave birth to two integrational initiatives: First, the Community of South American States (CASA) was created, which led to the foundation of UNASUR, turning Kirchner into a kind of modern ‘founding father’ of South American integration. Both of them, Gaviria and Kirchner, expressed a positive stance with regard to regional integration in Latin America. That is believed to be the reason why their appointments were not contested among member states; on the contrary, they gathered massive support from the most important players in the region, such as the United States, Brazil, and Venezuela.

3.3. SGS AS OUTCOMES OF TRANSNATIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM

Two cases under assessment would certainly qualify as typical examples of SGs who are byproducts of an increasingly cosmopolitan world, that is, they did not rely on national states nor ministries of foreign affairs to attain their leadership positions in IOs: Marcolino Gomes Candau and Sergio Vieira de Melo.

Marcolino Candau was an Assistant Superintendent of the Special Service of Public Health in Brazil, and that was the only governmental position he ever took during his lifetime before arriving to the WHO. His international career bypassed Itamaraty, as he was neither a career diplomat nor a political ambassador. His professional path was constructed by way of relationships with a dense web of health experts all around the world. His connections with people in academia, medical institutions and foundations (especially the Rockefeller Foundation) were key for him to eventually become the WHO’s top officer. Back in the 1940s, Candau’s technical expertise opened the doors at the WHO and provided him with international recognition and visibility. In 1953, somewhat surprisingly, the WHO’s decision-making body appointed Candau to be Director-General Brock Chisholm’s successor for a five-year term by a landslide majority vote (47 to 16) – an occasion when he was supported by the US delegation and all Latin American countries. Candau assumed office in July 1950 and was known as the Director-General who consolidated and stabilized the organization and endowed it with well-reputed technical and administrative competences.

Sergio Vieira de Melo, the son of a Brazilian diplomat, did not ever intend to become one, although he spent great part of his life in foreign countries. His academic background was in linguistics, especially the French language, and philosophy. In 1969, Melo was admitted to the UN, where he served as a translator and editor in the early beginnings. For over 30 busy years, he performed several duties within the ambit of UN missions, which took place in literally every corner of the world. It was no sooner than 2002 when he was finally appointed UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a post tantamount to that of SG. He passed away in the following year in Baghdad, having been lethally targeted by a terrorist attack.

The two SGs above cited did not follow careers in diplomacy nor defended their respective countries of origin in IOs. Besides, the international reputation they have acquired was more the result of long cultivated personal connections than a function of any institutional standing. In this particular sense, they are nothing but international bureaucrats, who possess a high level of expertise and, more importantly, a history inside an IO. In so being, the relationships they have built with their own countries of origin do not allow one to claim that a ‘diplomacy of prestige’ strategy was ever put into effect. Candau and Melo are the children of an increasingly interdependent world, in association with the power garnered by epistemic communities and informal networks.

However the case of Raúl Prebisch is uniquely tailored, his appointment to lead the ECLAC and UNCTAD can be considered a consequence of growing cosmopolitanism in the world. As an important economist in his country in the 1930s, Prebisch became a Minister of Finance in Argentina at a very young age. He had accumulated some previous experience in diplomatic negotiations with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with a view at creating a free trade area in the region. But as Prebisch began to be seen as a public enemy, and was ostracized by Juan Domingo Perón's regime, he never actually counted on the Argentinean ministry of affairs to campaign for him; just the other way around. It was U Thant, the UN Secretary-General himself, who first invited Prebisch to join the UN system as a lead officer. Again: if it were not for his personal achievements and global connections, he would not have reached the peak position neither at ECLAC nor at UNCTAD.

CONCLUSION

This article discussed the role of formal leaderships in International Organizations as tools for a 'policy of prestige' by Latin American states. We have submitted two hypotheses for appraisal: The first one was that a 'diplomacy of prestige' would be put into practice by rising Latin American states through the appointment and/or election of diplomats and politicians who took office as secretaries-general of major intergovernmental organizations; and the second one was that the tenure in office of Latin American secretaries-general would not be directly associated with any prestige-seeking governmental drive or an emerging country's manoeuvre for greater international status, but rather meant a collateral effect of growing transnational cosmopolitanism.

After briefly approaching 10 cases of Latin American SGs at regional and global organizations, we could identify at least 6 cases which provided some evidence for the hypothesis of existing strong connections between formal leaders and their countries of origin; 4 of them showcased the so-called 'diplomacy of prestige' (as we refer to it in this paper) being sponsored by ministries of foreign affairs in Ecuador and Brazil: José Ayala Lasso's, João Clemente Baena Soares', José Mauricio de Figueiredo Bustani's, and Rubens Ricupero's appointments are telling examples. The deviant case of Latin Union's SG Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti well illustrates how, no matter how suitable a candidate may be for a leadership position, his/her election may not be considered strategic or priority for a country's alleged interests. Two of our cases have suggested the existence of a policy of prestige of a new kind: former presidents Kirchner's and Gaviria's appointments to lead, respectively, Unasur and OAS possibly represent the coming of age of 'presidential diplomacy' in Latin America. To the best of our knowledge, their elections as SGs had more to do with personality traits and groundwork experience gained in dealing with diverse integration processes than with any particular move carried out by their countries' ministries of foreign affairs. Finally, two cases under assessment do exemplify the feasibility of our rival hypothesis. Candau's and Melo's appointments seemed to be more an outcome of transnational cosmopolitanism in the world than the output of a more direct strategy put forth by a given state or government. Both were not career diplomats and, seemingly, did not rely on their national foreign ministries to achieve leadership posts in IOs.

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APPENDIX

International Organization	SGs (Name, gender, period, nationality)	Nationality
OAS (Organization of American States)	Lleras Camargo, Alberto(m) (Colombia) - 1948 – 1954	Colombia (2) Chile (2) Uruguay (2) Ecuador Argentina Barbados Brazil Trinidad and Tobago Costa Rica
	Dávila, Carlos (m) (Chile) – 1954-1955	
	Mora, José Antonio (m) (Uruguay) – 1956-1968	
	Plaza Lasso, Galo (m) (Ecuador) – 1968 – 1975	
	Orfila, Alejandro (m) (Argentina) – 1975- 1984	
	McComie, Val (m) (Barbados) – 1984	
	Baena Soares, João Clemente (m) (Brazil) – 1984-1994	
	Thomas, Christopher R. (m) (Trinidad and Tobago) – 1994-1994	
	Gaviria Trujillo, César Augusto (m) (Colombia) – 1994-2004	
	Rodríguez Echeverría, Miguel Ángel (m) (Costa Rica) – 2004-2004	
CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)	Orlando Sotolongo	
ACS (Association of Caribbean States)	Molina, Germán Simón Duarte (m) (Venezuela) – 1995-2000	Venezuela
	Girvan, Norman (m) (Jamaica) – 2000-2004	Jamaica
	Silié Valdez, Rubén Arturo (m) (Dominican Republic) 2004-2008	Dominican Republic
	Andrade Falla, Luis Fernando (m) – 2008-2012 (Guatemala)	Colombia
	Cavadía, Alfonso Múnera (m) (Colombia) -2012-now.	Guatemala

<p>Caricom (Caribbean Community)</p>	<p>Demas, William (m) (Trinidad and Tobago) – 1973-1974</p> <p>McIntyre, Sir Alister (m) (Grenada) – 1974-1977</p> <p>Tyndall, Joseph (m) (Guyana) – 1977-1978</p> <p>King, Kurleigh Dennis (m) (Barbados) – 1978-1983</p> <p>Rainford, Roderick (m) (Jamaica) – 1983-1992</p> <p>Carrington, Edwin W. (m) (Trinidad and Tobago) 1992-2011</p> <p>Applewhaite, Lolita (f) (Barbados)- 2011-2011</p> <p>LaRocque, Irwin (m) (Dominica) 2011- now</p>	<p>Trinidad e Tobago (2)</p> <p>Grenada</p> <p>Guyana</p> <p>Barbados(2)</p> <p>Jamaica</p> <p>Dominica</p>
<p>OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States)</p>	<p>Lewis, Vaughan (m) (Saint Lucia) – 1982-1995</p> <p>Lestrade, Swinburne (m) (Dominica) 1996-2001</p> <p>Goodwin, George (m) (Antigua and Barbuda) – 2001-2003</p> <p>Ishmael, Len (f) (Saint Lucia) – 2003-2013</p> <p>Browne, Bentley A. (m) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) – 2014- now.</p>	<p>Saint Lucia (2)</p> <p>Dominica</p> <p>Antigua and Barbuda</p> <p>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</p>
<p>UNASUR (Union of South American Nations)</p>	<p>Kirchner, Néstor Carlos (m) (Argentina) – 2010-2011</p> <p>Mejía Vélez, Matría Emma (f) (Colombia) – 2011-2012</p> <p>Rodríguez Araque, Alí (m) (Venezuela) – 2012-2014</p> <p>Samper Pizano, Ernesto (m) (Colombia) – 2014 – now.</p>	<p>Argentina</p> <p>Colombia (2)</p> <p>Venezuela</p>
<p>CAN (Andean Community)</p>	<p>Alegrett Ruiz, Sebastián (m) (Venezuela) – 1997-2002</p> <p>De Soto Valderrama, Guillermo Roque Fernández (m) (Colombia) – 2002-2004</p> <p>Wagner Tizón, Edward Allan (m) (Peru) – 2004-2006</p> <p>Fuentes Hernández, Alfredo Luis (m) (Colombia) – 2006-2007</p> <p>Ehlers Zurita, Frederico (m) (Ecuador) – 2007-2010</p> <p>Contreras Baspineiro, Adalid (m) (Bolivia) – 2010-2013</p> <p>Tenenbaum de Reátegui, Ana María (f) (Peru) 2013-2013</p> <p>Cabrejas, Santiago Cembrano (m) (Colombia) 2013-2013</p> <p>Laugier, Pablo Guzmán (m) (Bolivia) 2013- now</p>	<p>Venezuela</p> <p>Colombia (3)</p> <p>Peru (2)</p> <p>Ecuador</p> <p>Bolivia (2)</p>
<p>MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)</p>	<p>Fernández Reyes, Jorge Enrique (m) (Uruguay) – 1997-1998</p> <p>Diaz Pereira, Ramón Antero (m) (Paraguay) 1998-</p>	<p>Uruguay (2)</p> <p>Paraguay (3)</p> <p>Argentina (2)</p>

	<p>2000</p> <p>González Cravino, Santiago J. (m) (Argentina) – 2001-2002</p> <p>Arcuri, Reginaldo Braga (m) (Brazil) 2003-2005</p> <p>Büttner Limprich, José Ernesto (m) (Paraguay) 2006-2007</p> <p>Quijano Capurro, José Manuel (m) (Uruguay) 2008-2009</p> <p>Colombo Sierra, Agustín Miguel (m) (Argentina) 2010-2011</p> <p>Miola, Jeferson (m) (Brazil) 2012-2014</p> <p>Pastore, Oscar (m) (Paraguay) 2014 – now</p>	Brazil (2)
LAIA (Latin American Integration Association)	<p>De Cerqueira Antúnes, António Jose (m) (Brazil) – 1993-1998</p> <p>Rojas Penso, Juan Francisco (m) (Venezuela) 1998-2005</p> <p>Operti Badán, Didier (m) (Uruguay) 2005-2009</p> <p>Fernández Estigarribia, José Félix (m) (Paraguay) 2009-2011</p> <p>Álvarez, Carlos Alberto (m) (Argentina) 2011- now</p>	<p>Brazil</p> <p>Venezuela</p> <p>Uruguay</p> <p>Paraguay</p> <p>Argentina</p>
SICA (Central American Integration System)	<p>Herrera Cáceres, Hector Roberto (m) (Honduras) – 1993-1997</p> <p>Leal Sánchez, Ernesto José (m) (Nicaragua) 1997-1999</p> <p>Herdocia Sacasa, Mauricio Ramón (m) (Nicaragua) 2000-2000</p> <p>Santamaría Jaimés, Óscar Alfredo (m) (El Salvador) 2000-2004</p> <p>Quiñónez Abarca, Aníbal Enrique (m) (Honduras) 2005-2009</p> <p>Alemán Gurdíán, Juan Daniel (m) (Nicaragua) 2009-2013</p> <p>Bonilla, Hugo Roger Martínez (m) (El Salvador) 2013-2014</p> <p>Velásquez de Avilés, Victoria Marina (f) (El Salvador) 2014- now.</p>	<p>Honduras (2)</p> <p>Nicaragua (3)</p> <p>El Salvador (3)</p>
WHO	Candau, Marcelino Gomes (1953) – Brazil	Brazil (1)
UN	Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (m) (Peru) (1982)	Peru (1)
WTO	Roberto Azevedo (2013) - Brazil	Brazil
UNWTO	Savignac, Antonio Enríquez	Mexico

	(m) (Mexico) (1990)	
ITSO	Astrain Castro, Santiago (m) (Chile) (1964/1973)	Chile
UNIDO	De Maria y Campos, Mauricio (m) (Mexico) (1993) Magariños, Carlos Alfredo (m) (Argentina) (2005)	Mexico Argentina
UPU	Botto de Barros, Adwaldo Cardoso (m) (Brazil) (1985)	Brazil
OPCW	Bustani, Jose M. (m) (Brazil) (1997) Pfirter, Rogelio (m) (Argentina) (2002)	Brazil Argentina
UNHCR	Ayala-Lasso, José (m) (Ecuador) (1994) Vieira de Mello, Sérgio (m) (Brazil) (2002) Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (m) (Gyana) (2003)	Ecuador Brazil Guayana
UNWOMEN	Bachelet, Michelle (Chile)	Chile
UNCTAD	Prebisch, Raúl (m) (Argentina) Pérez-Guerrero, Manuel (m) (Venezuela) Fortin, Carlos (m) (Chile) Ricupero, Rubens (m) (Brazil) Fortin, Carlos (m) (Chile)	Argentina Venezuela Chile Brazil

Source: IO BIO

Name	Occupation/ Course/Place of Birth	Worked for a private company?	Had a governmental position?	Worked at the ministry of foreign affairs?	Defended the national interest of a given country at an IO?	Worked at an IO before becoming a SG?	How was the appointment ? Who did it?
José Ayala Lasso	Diplomat/ Law, Economics and Political Science Quito, Equador	No	Minister of Foreign Affairs 1997	Diplomat in Several Places	Yes. Ecuador embassador at UN (1989-	Yes	Secretary- General Unanimity at General

					1994) President of the Security Council (1991- 1992)		Assembly
João Clemente Baena Soares	Diplomat/Law, Belém,Brazil	No	No	Diplomat in several places. Division Chief in Itamaraty – Cultural Relations, Department of IOs Secretary- General of Itamaraty (1979-1984)	No	. Worked as a internship at UN and OAS	Brazil All support of South America in 1984
José Maurício de Figueiredo Bustani	Diplomat/Law	No	No	Diplomat in Russia, Vienna Head of the Department of IOs associated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor	No	Brazil
Marcolino Gomes Candau	Doctor/ Medicine/	No	Assistant Superinten dent of the Special Service of Public Health (in Portuguese SESP, Serviço Especial de Saúde Pública)	No	No	Yes. WHO in 1952-1953	Director- General of WHO – Chisholm Close relationship with Soper
Geraldo Egídio da Costa Holanda Cavalcanti	Diplomat/ Law/ Recife,Pernambuco	No	No	Washington (1962) Moscow (1964) Belgium (1986-1990)	In 1963 Cavalcanti helped prepare the Brazilian delegation for the UN Conference on Trade and Developme	Inter- american Developme nt Bank,1959	Latin Union founder and Secretary- General (since 1983) Philippe Rossillon Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, a colleague

					nt (UNCTAD). In 1978 Cavalcanti was appointed Ambassado r to UNESCO, the UN Educational , Scientific and Cultural Organizatio n in Paris,		from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a mutual friend, had recommended The Brazilian government, however, did not fully support Cavalcanti at the time, as other diplomatic questions were considered to take precedence.
Cesar Augusto Trujillo Gaviria	Political Career, Economy	No	Chamber's Economic Affairs Committee Interior Minister	No	Yes. Andean Pact, establishing a free trade area and customs union between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in 1992, and brokered a trade liberalizatio n agreement with CARICOM , the Caribbean Community and Common Market, in 1994. Presidenti al Diplomacy	No	Diplomacy Department Brazil, Mexic o and US
Néstor Carlos Kirchner r	Political Career, Law	No	mayor of Rio Gallegos (1987- 1991), governor of Santa	No	Kirchner advanced an active foreign policy, was critical of the United	No	Argentinian Foreign Policy Department Venezuela

			Cruz (1991-2003) and President of Argentina (2003-2007)		States of America (US), opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, and re-established bilateral relations with Cuba. Integration endeavor Presidential Diplomacy		Ecuador
Rubens Ricuperolo	Diplomat/Law	No	Deputy Chief of Staff (1989) Ministry of Finance	Washington Italy Head of the South America-2 Division of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1987 he was appointed Ambassador at Brazil's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN) and moved to Geneva, where he worked with multilateral organizations, in particular in GATT negotiations.	No	Boutros-Ghali
Sergio Vieira de Melo	International Bureaucrat Linguist, Philosopher	No	No	No	No	French translator in UNHCR UNHCR – Personnel Department Political Counselor at FINUL High Commissioner of UNHCR International Relations	Kofi Annan

						Director – UNHCR Political Director of FORPRONU Director of Operation and Planning High Comissariat Assistant UNTAET Administrator	
Raúl Federico Prebisch Linares.	Economist	No	UnderSecretary of Finance Director-General of the Bank Central	Prebisch began negotiations with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay for a regional free trade area and strengthened relations with the United States (US) during a visit to Washington DC from November 1940 to February 1941	Prebisch's prospects narrowed to a short-term consultancy with the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America Executive Secretary of ECLA		U Thant

Source: Belém Lopes, 2016 ; Belém Lopes and Vasconcelos Neto, 2016; Dosman,2016; Hoffman,2016; Shaw, 2016;Cueto and Reinalda,2016.